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Abstract
We study the formation of government policy in democracies when turnout
depends on party activists and campaign spending  parties political cap-
ital. The functional importance of political capital determines equilibrium
rent-seeking in government. If activists and donors are better than the ordi-
nary voter at distinguishing between good governments and lucky governments,
then the more potent political capital is the less the extent of rent-seeking. This
situation also rules out nite limits on election spending, though a zero limit
could be the optimum if donors and activists are close enough substitutes in
the work they do for the party. The one policy which is never optimal is a nite
limit on local spending.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In the recent US presidential election the Obama and McCain campaigns respectively
spent $730mn and $368mn. Obama in particular also managed to recruit several
million volunteers, who contributed labor as well as money to their candidate.1 It
seems likely, taken in aggregate, that such resources played a part in the election
outcome.2 Furthermore, the non-trivial sums of both money3 and time contributed
are of course endogenous variables; but there is incomplete understanding of how
contributors respond to policy platforms, and in turn how policy is modied to appeal
to contributors.
An improved understanding of the linkages between policy, voting and contribu-
tions is desirable because there are important policy issues at stake. Calls for legal
limits on either donations or campaign expenditure are frequently heard, typically
on the grounds that such sums of money are perceived inevitably to be associated
with corruption or some other distortion of policy. On the other hand economists and
political scientists alike have frequently taken a more agnostic position, recognizing
that nance can have an important functional role in the electoral process.
In our analysis two parties compete for election, setting policy dened by ideo-
logical position, and expenditure on public goods. Voters are distributed uniformly
along the ideological scale, but all voters prefer greater amounts of the public good for
given taxes. In contrast party leaders are motivated by o¢ ce, and the wedge between
tax and public good expenditure. Any surplus may be spent on ego-projects, wasted
through bureaucracy, or more simply may reect pure rent-seeking. By denition the
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greater the level of rent-seeking, the lower the quality of government. Importantly,
voting is argued to be determined by policy as well as by campaigning activities,
which in turn are supported by nancial donations and the contributed labor of ac-
tivists - inputs which are themselves also determined by policy. To make this idea
operational we dene political capitalas the set of assets, in particular donors and
activists, available to parties which can help deliver the vote. But as we detail below
there are grounds for supposing that the policy preferences of contributors are in gen-
eral di¤erent from those of potential voters. Following May (1973) and subsequent
theoretical and empirical work in the political science literature we assume they are
more ideologically extreme. Therefore party leaders face a trade-o¤ between ideolog-
ical centralization as in standard Downsian models, and polarizing to please activists
and donors. Political capital thus can explain ideological divergence.4
However, the main focus of this paper is to analyze how the quality of government
changes depending on the importance of political capital in driving turnout, and
separately on the quantity of di¤erent elements of political capital. Our rst nding is
that, in general, you maximize the quality of government by maximizing the electoral
potency of whichever factor be it political capital or the potential voter is least
prone to mistake government competence for government luck or vice versa. We term
this ability political wisdom. However, this result is sensitive to the exact role played
by political capital. The better it is at converting voters from one party to another,
and the worse it is at mobilizing its existing supporters, the more likely it is that there
is an interior solution where we would not want to maximize the inuence of either
factor, even if one unambiguously possesses more political wisdom than the other.
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In the case where rent-seeking is increased as political capital becomes more potent
in driving the vote, we will want to reduce its potency. In the light of this we
therefore discuss possible means to reduce the impact of political capital, in particular
compulsory voting.
Reducing the importance of political capital is nonetheless a very distinct argu-
ment from limiting the quantity of political capital through particular legal limits on
campaign spending and advertising. In order to address the consequences of specic
legal limits the analysis disaggregates political capital into constituent parts: national
spending on advertising, local spending, and activists. Our second main nding is
that partial limits on total campaign expenditure, as frequently observed in practice,
can be optimal only if potential voters possess more political wisdom than either
donors or activists (and will not necessarily be optimal even then.) It is feasible that
an absolute ban on total spending could maximize the quality of government, but this
depends on activists being both more responsive to good government than donors,
and good substitutes for them in carrying on the campaign. In this case the stronger
the ban on spending the better. The third main nding is that any partial limit on
local spending alone can never be optimal.
In the next section we review some related literature before presenting the model
framework in Section 3. Equilibrium government quality and its relationship with
the potency of political capital is analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 analyzes how
government quality changes when legal limits on spending are imposed and Section
6 concludes.
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2 RELATED LITERATURE
The argument that voters are somehow malleable and in particular that campaign
expenditure can a¤ect the vote is not uncontentious.5 Austen-Smith (1991) and Baba
(1997) argue that a positive voting response to campaign expenditure implies irra-
tional voters because expensive advertising is a visible sign that money was paid over
to promote special interests against their own. On the other hand recent theoretical
work identies a functional role for advertising. Prat (2002) rationalizes advertis-
ing in a micro-founded model of campaign advertising in which an interest group
responds to insider signals relating to candidate quality. The interest group is able
to distort the policy platform (which is orthogonal to candidate quality) in exchange
for e¤ectively broadcasting candidate quality.6 Advertising thus facilitates election
of the better quality candidate. This insight is incorporated here in that campaign
advertising generates a positive voting response, and also that better quality govern-
ment generates larger donations and more willing activists thus creating a brake on
politiciansrent-seeking behavior.7 Coate (2004a) also highlights the importance of
advertising as a means of providing information about candidates.
Empirically Levitt (1994) found that campaign spending has little impact in de-
termining voting in US House elections. Nonetheless more recent work has been
supportive of the link. Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1996) nd that advertising inu-
ences voting in eld experiments. Gerber (2004) and Moon (2006) provide a rationale
for the weaker evidence that seems to relate especially to incumbents, distinguishing
between the objectives of maximizing vote share and gaining re-election. In straight-
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forward terms it is hard for an incumbent to increase vote share, whilst evidence
relating to re-election is more favorable. Indeed Erikson and Palfrey (1998 and 2000)
overturn this asymmetry nding spending by both incumbents and challengers to
be e¤ective drivers of the vote in a simultaneous equations specication. Relatedly
Gerber and Green (2000) provide experimental evidence in support of the idea that
wider campaigning activities undertaken by party activists have a positive e¤ect on
voter turnout.
The second key ingredient of the model is the assumption that donors and party
activists are skewed towards the ideological extremes. For activists, there is much
support for this proposition in the political science literature. Hirschman (1970)
argues this to be a consequence of spatial electoral competition: to exercise voice
extremists join parties. May (1973) argues for this as a general rule in all modern
democracies8 and Seyd et al (1996) provide supporting evidence from the UK. Scarrow
(1994) also characterizes party membership as distorting policy away from the median,
which is conceivable only if members are themselves inuential and relatively extreme
as we argue. Pedersen et al (2004) nd that party membership, and Ansolabehere et
al (2003) nd that donations, are driven by ideology, which we argue is consistent with
our approach. If party membership or nancial donation is costly, and a function of
your relative ideological distance from each party, then moderates (those in between
parties) are less likely to contribute than extremists all else equal.
The proposition that donors and activists can inuence the vote, together with
the observation that party activists and donors are more skewed toward the political
extremes, provides a mechanism underpinning ideological divergence. Of course, the
Maloney and Pickering. Page: 7
academic literature is not at all short of explanations for divergence. Wittman (1977
and 1983) models candidates as motivated by position rather than o¢ ce. Palfrey
(1984) suggests that putting your party in the centre invites someone else to start
a new one, place it on your outer ank, and steal all your support. Alternatively
candidates might be policy motivated and partially liberated from the median voter
due to a degree of uncertainty (Wittman, 1983; Calvert, 1985; Alesina, 1988.) The
well-attested fact that incumbents have an advantage over challengers has been used
to develop models where the candidates have di¤erent strategies which include di¤er-
ent ideological positions (Londregan and Romer, 1993). Groseclose (2001) predicts
centralization by the high quality candidate and polarization by the low quality can-
didate and Bruter et al (2010) demonstrate that equilibrium may not exist at all in
this framework.9
But a further version of the story - and one which is now popular following recent
presidential elections in the US - has parties tacking away from the centre to mobilize
their potential supporters actually to come out and vote for them (Peress, 2011).
Political commentators like the story that you do better if you make your core
voters turn out rather than chasing oating voters in the centre. (George Bushs
campaign of 2004 is held up as a successful example of this.) Political scientists have
looked at the evidence and are skeptical. Some of this skepticism rests on the nding
that people who say they care a lot who wins are scarcely more likely to vote than
people who care little (Rosenstone and Hanson, 1993). So even if core votersare
alienated it doesnt make them that much less likely to vote.
But it may make them much less likely to work for or give money to the party
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and help deliver other peoples votes. Party activists and donors have to date been a
neglected force in Downsian theories of spatial political competition.10 A notable ex-
ception, however, is Aldrich (1983a, 1983b). Aldrichs political activists are selected
negatively  the ideologically alienated and indi¤erent exclude themselves. Each
partys position is that of its median activist. The ideological position and the cohort
of activists are thus simultaneously determined, and Aldrich shows that this always
gives an equilibrium where the two parties are ideologically distinct. This an improve-
ment over candidate selectionmodels where candidates get nominated by replicating
the views of their partys median activist, a gure treated as exogenous. Where such
models do score over Aldrich is when they bring in candidates who choose a position
to maximize the joint probability of being nominated and then elected (Aranson and
Ordeshook, 1972).
In this article we combine the approaches of Aldrich and of Aranson and Or-
deshook. The number and political stance of activists and donors is endogenous, but
at the same time someone is looking at the goal of being elected and sees pleasing
the activists and potential donors as just a means to that end. We assume in fact
that party policy is decided centrally, with an eye on both the potential vote and
the political capital needed to get that vote out. The ideological location decision
turns out to be non-trivial: ideology drives voting through more than one channel.
A party that moves to the center may gain territory from its opponent, but at the
cost of party membership or income or both. For this reason parties dont necessarily
converge in the middle.
However whilst ideological divergence is an interesting by-product of the analysis,
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the main concern of our paper is the quality of government. A key relationship
in the analysis below is how donations respond to this variable. Donations have
themselves been typically modelled in the literature, in our opinion rather narrowly,
as either position-inducedor service-induced(Ashworth, 2008). In the former case
donations buy ideological inuence, in the latter the quid pro quo is special favor
"at the expense of citizens in general". On the other hand Ansolabehere et al (2003)
document that the vast majority of campaign contributions in the case of the U.S.
come in the shape of very small donations from individuals. Such donations seem
inconsistent with policy procurement. Instead Ansolabehere et al (2003) propose that
donating is a form of political participation or consumption. One possible story is
that donors obtain a return in the shape of votes generated from ensuing advertising.
Relatedly, it is not impossible that donors are acting out of altruism. This may be
unappealing to much of the economics literature, but it has to be acknowledged that
in most cases the quid pro quo from donations is far from obvious. An example could
be the 2008 US Presidential race in which Barack Obama enjoyed a massive nancial
advantage over John McCain. Anecdotal evidence at least suggests that in many
cases the donors were motivated through a perception that Obama was the more
e¤ective candidate and not solely through some self-interested agenda.11
Previous literature has addressed questions of campaign nance legislation and ad-
vertising, though only within the context of position- and service-induced donations.
Prat (2002) nds that a ban on donations or advertising can be welfare enhancing
depending on the trade-o¤ between position-distortion and greater competence (sig-
naled through truthful advertising). Coate (2004b) also models position-distorting
Maloney and Pickering. Page: 10
donors, nding that a ban may be welfare-enhancing especially because of a mech-
anism in which advertising e¤ectiveness increases with the strength of the limit on
campaign nance. This paper di¤ers from these approaches in three ways. Firstly
donations are motivated by competence as well as position. This seems appropriate
given the micro evidence discussed in Ansolabehere et al (2003). The second key point
of departure is that we look at campaign nance limits independently from possible
policies to alter the potency of political capital. Finally we disaggregate campaign
expenditure into local and national components and argue for distinct policy on each.
3 MODEL FRAMEWORK
The basic framework is two-party pre-electoral competition where both parties simul-
taneously announce policy, consisting of an ideological position and spending on a
public good (as distinct from waste or rent). As is common in the literature we uti-
lize a probabilistic voting framework, rst proposed by Hinich (1977) and Lindbeck
and Weibull (1987). Suppose there are two parties, L and R, facing an imminent
election. Voters are forward-looking, parties pre-commit to policy, and the penalties
of reneging are prohibitive. The partiesobjectives are symmetric, with party Ls
expected utility function written as
UL = pL (1  gL) (1)
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where p is its probability of being elected, and 0  g  1 measures spending on a pub-
lic good. Parties (or more accurately party leaders) are motivated rstly by o¢ ce, and
secondly the rents they may be able to extract in government. In (1) the normalized
maximum possible rent equals unity.12 There is no direct return to ideological position
taking, but any money not spent on public goods adds to utility. As described in the
introduction this may be spent on ego-projects, be wasted through bureaucracy, or
more simply may reect pure rent-seeking. An alternative interpretation of g is that
it represents politicianse¤ort (good for voters, but a badfor politicians). Whilst we
use the term rent-seekingit is worth bearing in mind throughout that more general
interpretations of g are possible and that it is a measure of the overall quality of
government.
The electorate is uniformly distributed along two axes. The horizontal one (0  1)
is ideological (left to right) and the vertical one (Cmin   Cmax) represents the net cost
of voting. The voting decision is modeled as a two-step sequence. Citizens rst decide
how to vote by considering which party they would prefer to be in power. This stage
determines the potential vote. Secondly citizens decide whether to vote for it or to
abstain the potential vote translates into the actual vote. In the rst step let citizen
is perceived utility from a L government be:
UiL =   ji   Lj+ 2!gL + KL   KR + 
h:
Here the rst term is is absolute ideological distance from party L, g is the partys
spending in government (at the expense of its own rents) and K is political capital,
Maloney and Pickering. Page: 12
so that the terms in K represent the persuasive propagandist e¤ect of each party
organization as to who would govern best. The rst role of political capital is thus to
convert potential voters. We also assume that  < 1, i.e. these e¤ects are subject to
diminishing returns. (We measure utility on whatever scale eliminates a coe¢ cient on
.) h is a random popularity shock (positive or negative) in favour of L and against
R. Let the value of h have a uniform frequency distribution between  h
2
and h

2
.
Hence
UiR =   jR   ij+ 2!gR + KR   KL   
h
so that, if i is the voter who is indi¤erent between L and R (i.e. UiL = UiR),
i =
L + R
2
+ ! (gL   gR) + KL   KR + 
h;
which, given the 0 1 ideological scale represents Ls potential vote JL, the proportion
of voters who prefer party L to party R, and hence the vote party L would get in the
event of a 100% turnout, i.e.
JL =
L + R
2
+ ! (gL   gR) + KL   KR + 
h: (2)
We interpret h to measure a partys luck and g to measure its competence. In the
analysis below we make use of  = !


= dJ/dg
dJ/dh
, which measures the electorates political
wisdom its ability not to mistake luck for competence or vice versa. If it mistakes
luck for competence, dU
dh
and hence dJ
dh
rises; and if it mistakes competence for luck
dU
dg
and hence dJ
dg
falls.
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But whether any potential voter actually turns out for party L depends on the sec-
ond, possibly more important, role of political capital, its capacity to induce turnout.
In the second step we thus represent voter is net subjective cost of voting, after his
preferred partys political capital has been to work on him, as Ci 

KL
JL

, so he will
vote if

KL
JL

> Ci.
KL
JL

arises as follows. Party Ls political capital is applied evenly to all its
potential voters. Voter is ration is thus KL
JL
. But because Ls e¤orts over each voter
are presumably subject to diminishing returns (ten leaets through the mailbox will
not be ten times as e¤ective as one) we write its impact on each voter as

KL
JL

where  < 1.
We now normalize C so that Cmax = 1. Since a party with no money and no
volunteers would presumably get a zero turnout (if only because no one would have
heard of it), we set Cmin at zero, so that K = 0 ensures that even the voter at Cmin
abstains. With C on this 0  1 scale, the proportion of voters for whom C <

KL
JL

will simply be

KL
JL

which thus measures turnout.
<<COMP: Place Fig. 1 about here>>
Hence the situation is as in Figure 1 and party Ls vote will be
VL = potential vote turnout = JL

KL
JL

= KLJ
1 
L ,
with a similar form for party R. This represents the vote production function, and
has political capital driving the vote through two distinct channels. To summarize so
far, then, voting performance depends on the potential voter base (JL) and political
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capital (KL) - the partiesparty nances and activists. This is a generalization of
the standard Downsian model which is the special case of  = 0 and  = 0. In
the remainder of this section and section 4 policy is analyzed using an aggregate
measure of political capital, with the objective of asking how policy depends on
the importance of political capital as a whole in driving votes (as captured by ).
Section 5 disaggregates political capital into national advertising, local advertising
and activism, enabling analysis of the consequences of limiting campaign spending.
3.1 POLITICAL CAPITAL
Given the argument made in the literature review, we assume that party activists
and donors are more skewed toward the political extremes than the electorate as a
whole. In what follows we assume that political capital is spread across the ideological
spectrum with a distribution
K () = Q exp jc (0:5  )j (3)
where c  0, the size of c determining how skewed towards the extremes. (In the
limiting case of c = 0 political capital, like potential voters, is distributed uniformly).
Q is a scale parameter.
Thus there is a stock of political capital part of which parties can obtain through
choosing their policy platforms. It is this that potentially drags parties away from the
ideological middle ground. We assume that activists and contributors help a party
if they like it enough (i.e. if the psychic gains of helping it exceed the trouble.) A
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natural assumption is that the psychic gains of helping a party are inverse to your
ideological distance from it, but the cost (time, money and e¤ort) is constant. Let
z be the critical ideological distance. Ls range of activists therefore stretches from
L   z to L + z. The centrifugal force follows from the parameter c: parties can
increase their political capital by moving away from the centre.
We are thus treating political capital di¤erently from potential voters in three
ways. First, it is banked up towards the extremes, not evenly distributed across the
spectrum. Second, given that no one is acting on the activists to raise their turnout,
there is no need to introduce the complication of di¤erent individual costs. (Putting
it in greatly complicates the mathematics without altering any of our conclusions.)
Finally, we model them as being driven by absolute distance from the nearest party,
not by the relative proximity of the two parties.13
As with potential voters, we assume that activists and donors are also susceptible
to good governance.14 and possibly also to popularity shocks. To incorporate these
ideas we assume that the popularity shock h will widen Ls range of capital and
narrow that of R by bh at either end, while, if party L spends more than party R,
that will widen Ls range of capital, and narrow that of R by g0 (where g0 = gL gR)
at either end (like bh this amount of course can be positive or negative). Then if, for
instance,  = 2b, we would have the situation depicted in Figure 2.
<<COMP: Place Fig. 2 about here>>
Generalizing, then, dK
dg0 =
dK
dg
= 
b
 
dK
dh

. In section 4 we make use of  = 
b
, which
represents political capitals political wisdom just as  did for the potential voters.
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And, given the symmetrical distribution of both potential voters and political capital
between left and right, it follows that the two parties incentives, as they choose
public spending and ideological distance from the centre, are identical. So in any
Cournot-Nash equilibrium the partiespositions are symmetrical i.e. L + R = 1,
and gL   gR = 0.
Given this structure it is possible that there are activists and donors simultane-
ously within distance z of both parties. In this instance we assume that they work
for the one to which they are closest. In the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, this amounts
to working for L(R) if their ideological score is less (greater) than 0:5. Also note that
the range of activists is truncated at 0 and 1, so that Ls leftmost activist will be at
max (0; L   z). But, precisely because of the truncation, L   z will always be non-
negative: as long as L z < 0, a move to the center would gain both potential voters
and centre-ground political capital without losing any of the ideologically-extreme
capital. Hence max (0; L   z) = L   z.
To summarize, Ls range of political capital will be

L   z; 

where  = min (L + z; 0:5).
Its total capital will therefore be the integral of the density function between these
two limits:
KL =
Z _
L z
K () d =
Q
c

exp [c (0:5  L + z)]  exp
h
c

0:5 
_

i
: (4)
The comparative statics (i.e. how political capital responds to changes in ideological
stance) can now be considered. Suppose L increases by d (L moves towards the
centre.) Given L   z  0, L will lose K
 
j=L z

capital on the left. If its stock
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of activists is abutting that of R at 0.5, then it will gain 0:5K
_


capital from R; if
not, it will gain K
_


unemployed capital. Either way, the sum of Ls gain and Rs
loss will be K
_


 K  j=L z, i.e.
dKL
dL
  dKR
dL
= K
_


 K  j=L z = Qexp hc0:5  _i  exp [c (0:5  L + z)]
=  cKL: (5)
Equation (5) gives a useful and simple result: when the left-wing party marginally
shifts to the centre, its relative political capital falls proportionately to its existing
stock. Thus even though the centrist shift increases capital in the centre, and may
also eat into the oppositions capital, the net e¤ect on relative political capital is still
negative due to the larger loss on the partys extremist wing.
3.2 IDEOLOGICAL EQUILIBRIUM
Now consider how the parties choose their ideological position so as to maximize their
objective in equation (1). Since U = p (1  g) parties will choose a position () such
that p () is maximized. We now establish what determines dp
d
.
Lemma 1 dpL
dL
= dV
0/dL
h: dV 0/dh
Proof: Let V 0 = VL VR and v0 = V 0jh=0. Then V 0 = V 0 (v0; h) and dpLdL =
dpL
dv0
dv0
dL
=
dpL
dv0
dV 0
dL
dV 0/dv0 . Let
bh be the value of h needed for V 0 = 0. Then pL = ph > bh = 0:5  bhh
(given hs rectangular distribution between h
2
and h

2
) and dpL
dv0 =
d
dbh
h
p

h > bhi : dbh
dv0 =
  1
h
dbh
dv0 . Since V
0 = V 0 (v0; h), dV 0 = dv0 dV
0
dv0 +dh
dV 0
dh
and therefore (since bh is the value
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of h such that V 0 = 0) dbh
dv0 =   dV
0/dv0
dV 0/dh )
dpL
dv0 =
1
h :
dV 0/dv0
dV 0/dh )
dpL
dL
= dV
0/dL
h: dV 0/dh .
As a reminder, the ow of e¤ects from ideology to the vote is as in Figure 3 below.
<<COMP: Place Fig. 3 about here>>
Figure 3 shows the two distinct e¤ects of capital on the vote. Capital can both
increase the volume of potential voters through the conversion e¤ect, and increase
the actual vote by mobilizing its potential voters.
In what follows, we use @V
@K
to represent the mobilization e¤ect of political capital,
and dJ
d
to represent the total e¤ect of ideology on the potential vote, i.e. the sum of
the direct e¤ect and the indirect e¤ect from conversions made by the changing stock
of political capital.
Proposition 1 Parties will either centralize to the median voter, or polarize to the
point where L = z; R = 1  z.
Proof. See appendix.
Parties will either end up at the poles or converge in the middle. The reason is
simple. Because political capital is skewed towards the extremes, your loss of political
capital becomes successively smaller as you move from a polar position to a central
one and your gain of political capital successively larger as you move from a central
position to a polar one. If the journey either way is worth starting, it must be even
more worth nishing. It will thus always pay parties to move towards or away from
the centre. If they do the latter, however, party L will not end up at L = 0, but
rather at L = z, the point at which, as we have discussed, any further leftward
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move results in an unambiguous loss of votes. R, by similar reasoning will end up at
R = 1  z.
Proposition 2 There is a unique value of  above which L = z = 1   R (which
we will call the polarity outcome) and below which L = R = 0:5 (the median voter
outcome).15
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 2 establishes that as  increases there is a tipping point at which the
ideological equilibrium moves from a median voter equilibrium to the polarity equi-
librium. When the mobilization channel becomes su¢ ciently important in generating
votes, then party leaders are obliged to raise capital through polarizing to please ac-
tivists and donors. It is possible that the model provides a vehicle for understanding
the increased polarization of political parties in the US in the 1980s documented by
Abramowitz and Saunders (1998).16 More generally, we observe that political compe-
tition in Anglo-Saxon countries seems to uctuate between consensual and polarized
politics, and has on occasion switched rather rapidly. As the value of  increases,
then a tipping point may be reached at which the two parties diverge. In contrast to
most models of political competition, which either predict convergence or divergence,
the model proposed here can accommodate both depending on the strength of .
4 THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT
In this section we consider how the choice of public spending, g (and therefore equilib-
rium rent-seeking and social welfare) also depends on . We discuss possible means
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by which  might be modied so as to maximize the quality of government, and
compulsory voting in particular.
From (1) the party maximizes its expected utility at
gL = 1  pL
dpL/ dgL
= 1  0:5
dpL/ dgL
(in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium where p = 0:5).
Maximizing welfare thus comes down to maximizing dpL/ dgL, i.e. making a partys
election chances as sensitive as possible to the sacrice of rents. Here, by analogy
with the expression we derived for dp
d
, dpL
dgL
= dV
0/dgL
h: dV 0/dh .
In contrast to the previous section, the results now fall out more easily if we use
dV
dK
to represent the total e¤ect of K on V , i.e. the sum of the direct (mobilization)
e¤ect and the indirect e¤ect via Ks e¤ect on J (conversion e¤ect.) This time, then,
it is dJ
d(g;h)
that we write as a partial derivative, signifying that it represents only the
direct e¤ect of g or h on J and not the indirect e¤ect via K. Hence:
h
dpL
dgL
=
dV 0/ dgL
dV 0/ dh
=
dV 0
dKL
dKL
dgL
+ dV
0
dKR
dKR
dgL
+ dV
0
dJL
@JL
@gL
+ dV
0
dJR
@JR
@gL
dV 0
dKL
dKL
dh
+ dV
0
dKR
dKR
dh
+ dV
0
dJL
@JL
@h
+ dV
0
dJR
@JR
@h
where dV
0
dK
= @V
0
@K
+ dV
0
dJ
dJ
dK
:
Since dV
0
dKL
=   dV 0
dKR
and dV
0
dJL
=   dV 0
dJR
,
h
dpL
dgL
=
dV 0
dKL
dK0
dgL
+ dV
0
dJL
@J 0
@gL
dV 0
dKL
dK0
dh
+ dV
0
dJL
@J 0
@h
=
 dV
0
dKL
dK0
dh
+  dV
0
dJL
@J 0
@h
dV 0
dKL
dK0
dh
+ dV
0
dJL
@J 0
@h
(6)
where K 0 = KL KR and J 0 = JL  JR: Equation (6) is a weighted average of  and
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. If we write the weight on  as w, then (omitting the L subscript from now on)
w
1  w =
dV 0
dK
dK0
dh
dV 0
dJ
@J 0
@h
: (7)
But we are now taking dV 0/ dK as the total derivative of V 0 with respect to K, i.e.
w
1  w =
dK 0/ dh
@J/ @h
 
@V 0
@K
+ dV
0
dJ
dJ
dK
dV 0
dJ
!
=
dK 0/ dh
@J/ @h

@V 0/ @K
dV 0/ dJ
+
dJ
dK

: (8)
Since the only terms on the right hand side that will change as  changes are @V 0/ @K
and dV 0/ dJ (we are either at the polar or the median voter equilibrium so that the
value of the other terms is xed by the value of ), it follows that
d
d

w
1  w

=
dK 0/ dh
@J/ @h
:
d
d

@V 0/ @K
dV 0/ dJ

=
dK 0/ dh
@J/ @h
:
d
d

J
(1  )K

(using the production function V = KJ1 .) d
d
 
w
1 w

, and thus dw
d
, are positive.
So the higher  the greater the weight of  as against  in determining dp/ dg. It
follows that dp/ dg is increasing (decreasing) in  when  > (<) .
The intuition here is that the incentive to govern better (raise g) depends on how
far this will raise the probability of being elected. What equation (6) shows us is
that the standard of government will depend not on dK/ dg and dJ/ dg (absolute
response of K and J to lower rents) but on  and , the political wisdomparameters
that measure how J and K weight a governments competence against its luck when
deciding who to support. Even if political capital is twice as impressed by good
government as are potential voters, an increase in its potency via  will not help
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welfare if it is three times as impressed by fortunate government. Parties would tell
themselves that they might get twice as big a present from political capital if they ran
the country better, but that they will be handed three times as big a penalty come
the next unpopularity shock. In this case parties would actually be less sensitive to
the opinions of activists and donors than to those of ordinary voters, and welfare
would be increased by the latter having more say with lower .
However, it is not yet possible to turn this analysis into a general proposition
concerning the quality of government because we have not yet considered what will
happen to g as  crosses  and the system tips from the median voter to the polarity
outcome. The mathematics here is cumbersome and we work it out in the Appendix
(Proposition A1.) The result we get is that, at  = ,
h

dp
dg

P
 

dp
dg

M

=
2 (  ) (1  )VMVP
(XP + YP ) (XM + YM)



dK 0/ dh
K

P
 

dK 0/ dh
K

M

+ 2 (1  )

dJ
dK
dK 0
dh

P
 

dJ
dK
dK 0
dh

M

(9)
where the subscripts P and M relate to the polarity and median voter cases respec-
tively and X = dV
0
dK
dK0
dh
and Y = dV
0
dJ
@J 0
@h
. The expression dp/ dg will jump as the
ideological equilibrium tips from the median voter to polarity. The direction of the
jump, i.e. the sign of the right-hand side of (9) depends on what political capital is
doing. If it is simply mobilizing voters and not converting them, then dJ/ dK = 0
and the right-hand side has the opposite sign to (  ) i¤

dK0/dh
K

M
>

dK0/dh
K

P
.
But since (as we show in the appendix: Proposition A2) this is always the case, it
follows that

dp
dg

P
 

dp
dg

M
always has the opposite sign to (  ) and hence the
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opposite sign to d(dp/dg)
d
at all  6= . Whatever the trend of dp/ dg (and thus of the
quality of government) as  rises, it is interrupted by a jump in the opposite direction
at . The situation is as depicted in Figure 4(a) or 4(b).
<<COMP: Place Fig. 4 about here>>
While political capitals power to mobilize voters at the margin rises with , it falls
as we cross from the median voter to the polarity outcome, simply because parties
now have more political capital and its marginal product is thus down. So, whether
the e¤ect of rising  is to raise or lower the quality of government, there will be an
interruption at .
If, however, K is capable both of mobilizing existing supporters and creating new
ones, the sign of
h
dp
dg

P
 

dp
dg

M
i
=
becomes ambiguous. To show that it can
now be the same as the sign of    , take the case where c and  are both large,
i.e. the supply of political capital is steeply banked towards the ideological extremes
and its power to convert voters subject to only mildly diminishing returns. Since, as
c ! 1, dp/ d !  1 (equation (A3) in the appendix), so that  ! 0 (parties go
for the poles however low  is) and since as  ! 1, dJ/ dK !  equation (9) shows
us that as c!1 and  ! 1,
h

dp
dg

P
 

dp
dg

M

! 4 (  )VMVP
(XP + YP ) (XM + YM)

dK 0
dh

P
 

dK 0
dh

M

:
We show in the appendix (proposition A3) that, if c is large enough,
 
dK0
dh

P
   dK0
dh

M
	
must be positive. In this case, the jump in dp/ dg, and hence g, at  =  enhances
the trend in these variables as  rises:  > (<)  now means that dp/ dg not only
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rises (falls) with rising  at all  6=  but jumps up (down) at  = . We are in
Figure 4(c) or (d).
So why might dp/ dg, and hence g, jump in di¤erent directions at  =  depend-
ing on the ability of donors and activists to convert, and not just mobilize, voters?
The intuition is as follows. As  crosses the threshold and you move to the polar
equilibrium, two forces are acting on the power of increased g to raise more votes by
increasing political capital. On the one hand, provided c is large enough,17 the ab-
solute increase in capital from a given rise in g is now enhanced. On the other hand,
because the number of your existing donors and activists underwent a discontinuous
leap when you moved out from the centre ground, each new unit of political capital
you pick up brings a lower return. Which tendency will dominate, the fact that rising
g will bring in more new capital, or the fact that each unit of this new capital will
be less productive? The answer is that it may very well depend on whether produc-
tivemeans productive in mobilizing voters or converting them. If you are converting
voters, the increase in your share of the total vote is proportional to the number you
convert. Turnout is una¤ected and you are simply taking voters away from the other
side. Admittedly you are doing so at a diminishing rate but the diminishing returns
are not as bad as they are when you are in the business of mobilizing voters who
prefer you already. In this latter case, not only does each additional unit of political
capital mobilize fewer additional voters but its contribution to your share of the total
vote diminishes even faster, because each time you are picking up new voters against
an ever larger voter base (created by you and your rival as you pushed up turnout
with your political capital.) It is therefore entirely possible for the leap from the
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median voter outcome to the polarity outcome to strengthen the incentive to give up
rents for capital that will convert voters, but weaken the incentive to give up rents for
capital that will merely mobilize them.18 In that case, the key variable dp/ dg could
jump either way at  = , depending on what your donors and activists are best at
doing.
However, even if the upward (downward) trend in g is interrupted rather than
enhanced at , it will still reach its absolute maximum or minimum at  = 1.  = 0
by contrast, is not invariably a maximum or a minimum.
Proposition 3 g will always have an extreme value at  = 1, but not necessarily at
 = 0.
Proof. When w
1 w (relative weight of  to  in determining dp/ dg) is maximized,
then dp/ dg will be maximized (minimized) when  >  ( < ). But when  = 1,
dV 0/ dJ = 0 and so w
1 w becomes innite (equation (7)). Hence dp/ dg will always
have an absolute maximum or minimum value at  = 1. But at  = 0 things are
less certain. If political capital is only mobilizing voters and not converting them,
dJ/ dK = 0. When  = 0 it is also the case that @V 0/ @K = 0 and so w
1 w = 0
(equation (8)). dp/ dg thus has an extreme value at  = 0 as well as  = 1. But
when dJ/ dK > 0, not only does w
1 w remain positive when  = 0 but, as equation (9)
shows, the size of the jump in dp/ dg as  crosses  does not tend to zero as  ! 0.
Therefore there must be some  close enough to zero that the jump in dp/ dg at  is
greater than the change in dp/ dg between  = 0 and  =  @. If these two changes
are in opposite directions (i.e. if we are not in the situations depicted by Figure 4c
and 4d) then dp/ dg will have a more extreme value at  =  + @ than at  = 0. In
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such a case we are in Figure 4(e) or (f).
Once again, then, the ability of political capital to convert voters and not just
mobilize them adds ambiguity to an otherwise clear-cut result. The logic this time
is that the e¤ect at  = 1 is unambiguous; capital no longer su¤ers diminishing
returns as it gets the electorate out to vote, and the number of potential voters is
irrelevant. Political capital is already doing everything to win the election and the
size of the potential electorate doing nothing, and this will be the best (worst) case
for the public welfare if political capital possesses more (less) political wisdom than
the electorate at large. When  = 0 the situation is more nuanced. The ability of any
additional political capital to mobilize electors has been reduced to zero but its ability
to convert them may have increased: we are at the median voter equilibrium and the
stock of political capital is smaller. Once again we have to ask the question: does
the increased marginal ability of capital to deliver converts outweigh the decreased
marginal ability of g to deliver capital? Suppose the answer is yes. Then, should a
party raise g by enough to recruit, say, 1000 more potential voters, the indirect e¤ect
via political capital will have delivered more of them than would be the case in the
polarity outcome. If political capital is less swayed by popularity shocks than are the
potential voters themselves, it follows that it will now need a bigger popularity shock
for the 1000 voters to disappear again. In other words, so far as the conversion of
voters is concerned, dp/ dg is up.
It is thus possible that, even if  > (<) ,  = 0 will not be the worst (best)
outcome for the standard of government. But this result, to repeat, depends on
donors and activists being able to convert voters to their side, not just get existing
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supporters out to vote. If all political capital does is bring out its core vote, then
welfare has an absolute maximum or minimum at  = 0 as well as  = 1. The ability
of political capital to make converts is necessary and not su¢ cient to upset this
result.
If the result does stand, then a benevolent authority which could manipulate ,
for the general good, to wherever it liked, could ignore the zigzag in the curves in
Figure 4: we want whatever policies will give political capital the largest (if  > ) or
smallest (if  < ) inuence on the outcome of the election. But what if  = 1 and
 = 0 are unattainable? Take, for instance, the option of making voting compulsory.
If this really did raise turnout to 100%, political capital would be unable to mobilize
any voters because the law would have done this already. In this case  = 0. But
before inferring that compulsory voting must therefore produce the worst (best) of all
outcomes if donors and activists possess more (less) political wisdom than ordinary
voters, we should note that even under compulsory voting it is unlikely that party
workers and advertising would ever be completely superuous, as a look at Australia
will show. There is still a role for suasion, encouragement, and knocking up one hour
before the polls close.
And if compulsory voting does serve to reduce , but not to zero, it could conceiv-
ably represent a welfare improvement in any of the cases depicted in Figure 4 with
the exception of case 4c. In all the others we can nd a lower and a higher  such
that dp/ dg is raised by moving  from the higher to the lower value. In cases 4a and
4e, this is despite the fact that  > . It is true that a case for compulsory voting
could exist in these cases only if we start o¤ at the polar equilibrium, but empirical
Maloney and Pickering. Page: 28
research often nds that there are systematic party di¤erences in ideology, as found
e.g. in the US by Ansolabehere et al (2001) and Poole and Rosenthal (1984 and 1997)
and internationally within analyses of Manifesto content (Budge et al, 1987). In the
context of our model this evidence suggests that  is high enough for democracies to
end up above  regardless of the relative political wisdom of political capital and
the electorate. So, even in cases 4a and 4e, if  is close to (but greater than) ,
then a reduction in  of the right size would improve government quality. Assuming
compulsory voting does reduce the role of capital (to the extent people now go and
vote anyway), it could raise economic welfare in both these cases. We might even
want to vary the penalties for failing to vote (which presumably reduce  as they
strengthen) to try and get to the optimal .
To summarize this section, you want the election result to be called not by the
people who give a government the most credit for good performance but by those who
see most clearly what counts as merit and what counts as luck. Voters or activists who
give credit or blame where it is not due will hinder the cause of better government,
even if they give the politicians larger rents with which they can console themselves for
the unfairness of it all. If voters and activists fall into the opposite error mistaking
competence for luck the e¤ect is much the same, except that now, instead of dK/ dh
or dJ/ dh having risen, dK/ dg or dJ/ dg has fallen.
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5 THE EFFECTS OF LEGAL LIMITS ON CAM-
PAIGN EXPENDITURE
We now generalize the vote production function to consider the consequences of legal
limits on total election spending, as well as separate limits at the national and local
levels. In contrast with Section 4, instead of examining how government quality
is driven by the importance of political capital through the parameter , we now
examine the consequences of limiting aspects ofK. Farrell andWebb (2000) document
limits on total campaign spending in general elections in Canada, France, Ireland,
Japan as well as in presidential elections in the US. There are also limits on spending
at the constituency level in the UK and New Zealand.
To see what happens when campaign spending is limited, we must start treating
donors and activists separately. If V = f (M [g; h] ; A [g; h] ; J [g; h]) and if we now
write dM/dg
dM/dh
and dA/dg
dA/dh
as 1 and 2 respectively, then (6) becomes
h
dp
dg
=
dV 0/ dg
dV 0/ dh
=
1
dV 0
dM
dM 0
dh
+ 2
dV 0
dA
dA0
dh
+ dV
0
dJ
@J 0
@h
dV 0
dM
dM 0
dh
+ dV
0
dA
dA0
dh
+ dV
0
dJ
@J 0
@h
: (10)
Suppose now that the government imposes a binding limit M on what parties can
spend on an election. dV 0/ dM is now zero. What will happen to our measure of
the standard of government dp/ dg?19 If we initially assume M and A to be perfectly
unsubstitutable, so that dV 0/ dA is independent of M , (10) becomes
h
dp
dg

M=M
=
2
dV 0
dA
dA0
dh
+ dV
0
dJ
@J 0
@h
dV 0
dA
dA0
dh
+ dV
0
dJ
@J 0
@h
: (11)
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dp/ dg will thus be raised (lowered) by the cash limit if 1 < (>)wc2 + (1  wc) 
where wc =
dV 0
dA
dA0
dh
dV 0
dA
dA0
dh
+ dV
0
dJ
@J0
@h
.
But this is on the basis that there is no substitutability betweenM and A. If they
are even partial substitutes, any reduction in M will raise dV 0/ dA; and the greater
the substitutability, the stronger this e¤ect. So the question now is whether a rise in
dV 0/ dA will raise or lower the quality of government. From (11),
h
d (dp/ dg)
d (dV 0/ dA)

dV 0/dM=0
=
(2   ) dA0dh dV
0
dJ
@J 0
@h 
dV 0
dA
dA0
dh
+ dV
0
dJ
@J 0
@h
2
hence, if 2 > , the position is as follows. The lower M, the more productive
the substitute or part-substitute factor A; and the more productive A becomes, the
higher dp/ dg. So, if the fact of imposing a limit on election spending damages the
quality of government, any tightening of that limit will mitigate some of the damage.
If the mere existence of a limit is good for the quality of government, tightening it will
make things even better. Either way we are raising the potency of the politically wise
activists with every dollar we remove from their substitute resource, the campaign
fund. When by contrast 2 < , a tighter restriction on M will still raise dV 0/ dA
but this will now amplify any damage and reduce any benet from the fact that M
is limited at all.
<<COMP: Place Fig. 5 about here>>
Altogether the possibilities are:
(1) 1 < wc2 + (1  wc)  and 2 > . Here all restrictions on election spending
are desirable, and the bigger the restriction the better. The spending limit removes
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the inuence on policy of donors, who are relatively ill-informed politically: tightening
it then raises the inuence of the activists, the wisest of the three groups.
(2) and (3) 1 < wc2 + (1  wc)  and 2 < . Setting a limit just below what
parties would have chosen freely leads to better government, but the benets tail o¤
again as the limit is tightened. In case (2) any limit remains preferable to no limit
but in case (3) some limits are strict enough to be worse than a free-for-all. Here,
once again, it is a good thing to remove the inuence of the donors, but you spoil
things if you then ramp up the inuence of the activists against that of the ordinary
voters, who are wisest of all the three classes. If dV 0/ dA is sensitive enough to M ,
and the impact e¤ect of limiting M weak enough, you end up in case (3) rather than
(2).
(4) and (5) are the opposite cases to (2) and (3) respectively. Here 1 > wc2 +
(1  wc)  and 2 > . A limit on election spending in itself is a bad but the damage
will be reduced (and in case (4) actually reversed) by a strict enough limit. Having
made the mistake of taking away the donorspowers to inuence the government or
would-be government, we make some amends by pushing up that of the activists.
Finally case (6) (1 > wc2 + (1  wc)  and 2 < ) is the case where any limit
on election spending is bad, and it gets worse as the limit is tightened. The donors
should never have had their inuence on their party reduced; insult is then added to
injury by favouring the activists against the more astute electorate-at-large.
So the optimal policy towards election spending is in each case is:
(1) and (4) zero limit.
(2) and (3) limit just below MF (the amount the party would spend if not re-
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stricted).
(5) and (6) no limit.
All the above, however, is relative to the substitutability of volunteers and money
as the party goes about its work. As the substitution becomes more imperfect, the
e¤ect, as we have argued, is to lower the sensitivity of dV 0/ dA to the level of M; all
the slopes in Figure 5 become atter. In particular, we might shift from case (4) to
case (5). It is thus entirely possible that whether a zero limit or no limit on election
spending is preferable comes down to the extent that money and volunteers can do
one anothers work.
But the substitutability between M and A may depend on the level at which the
electioneering is taking place. They are likely to be closer substitutes at local than at
national level, where there are some things that only money can do (buying television
and radio time, buying advertisement space, hiring professional propagandists.) We
examine the consequences of this by taking the simplest case, where M and A are
perfect substitutes at local level20 but not in the national campaign. To represent
this we now write the vote production function as
V =M 1 (M2 + A)
  J1  (12)
where M1 is money spent on the national campaign (advertising, broadcasts, spin
etc.) and  captures the e¤ectiveness of this spending, M2 is money spent on local
campaigns and A is the e¤ort put in by volunteers. In the absence of legal restrictions,
a partys money (M) can be divided betweenM1 andM2 as it pleases. It can be seen
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that M2 and A are perfect substitutes in the production of votes.
A party trying to maximize its vote will, if allowed, split its funds between M1
and M2 so that dV / dM1 = dV / dM2. Given (12), this requires that (   )M1 =
 (M2 + A) i.e.
M2 =
   

M    A:
This relationship will hold whether total election spending is unrestricted or held
down to some M.
Let us therefore compare a limit of total spending of a given M =M and a limit
on local spending of M2 =
  

M    A. Local spending will be the same in both
cases, and therefore so will the value of dV 0/ dA the volunteers have their potency
increased by exactly the same reduction in the substituteM2. The di¤erence between
the two cases is that the limit on total spending as always cuts dV 0/ dM to zero. The
limit on local spending also reduces dV 0/ dM some money which could be more
e¤ectively spent at local level will now have to be spent nationally instead but it
doesnt reduce it to zero.
The situation is therefore as depicted in Figure 6, which is Figure 5 with the
e¤ects of local limits added. The horizontal axis always measures local spending M2,
but the L line traces what happens to dp/ dg when M2 = M2 (local limit) while the
G line represents the case where M2 =
  

M    A. The L line is above or below
the G line because with a limit on purely local spending dV 0/ dM is merely reduced,
not zero. The lines have the same slopes because a given level of M2, however it was
reached, gives us a given value of dV 0/ dA.
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<<COMP: Place Fig. 6 about here>>
None of the optima change, except in case (4) where the optimum is now a local
limit of zero. The one policy which is never optimal is a partial limit on M2: and the
reason is simple. For partial limits to be better than zero limits and no limits, the
impact e¤ect (i.e. e¤ect at MF   ) of a restriction has to be positive, and for local
limits to be better than general ones, the impact e¤ect has to be negative.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we analyze the importance of campaign advertising and nance in
determining voting equilibria and the quality of government. If this political capital
is more skewed towards the political extremes than the electorate in general it may,
but does not necessarily, pull the parties away from a Downsian equilibrium where
both are at the centre. Whether it does so is sensitive to very small changes in its
power to raise turnout, which could help explain the large and sudden changes in
partiesideological positions observed around the world.
The equilibrium level of rent-seeking, and hence the quality of government, de-
pends on both the potency and the permitted level of political capital. The analysis
hinges on three questions.
(1) Is it political capital (donors and activists) or ordinary voters who are better
at assessing the quality of the government?
(2) Is political capital better at changing votersparty preferences or at delivering
the votes of existing supporters?
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(3) How close a substitute are activists and money at national and local level?
Whether we want to enhance or reduce the potency of political capital depends
on the answers to questions (1) and (2). If it is activists and donors who are better at
distinguishing between rent-seeking and random events which a¤ect a governments
performance through no fault of its own, then to maximize their inuence on the re-
sult of the election is to maximize welfare. If ordinary voters are the better guardians
of competent government, then we would want to maximize their inuence and min-
imize that of political capital, if all the latter does is deliver the votes of existing
supporters. Compulsory voting would be one way of doing this. If, however, donors
and activists are capable of converting voters to their own side and not just getting
existing supporters out to vote, the best result may be an interior solution where
neither voters nor political capital have their potency at its possible maximum.
Whether we want to restrict the quantity of political capital, by putting limits on
campaign expenditure, depends on the answers to questions (1) and (3). Because of
concerns that contributors inuence policy, limits on expenditure and donations have
been called for and implemented in many di¤erent countries. In Section 5 we split
political capital into money and volunteer e¤ort. Whether nancial limits improve
government quality again depends on which factor has the greater power to deter
rent-seeking, i.e. which factor has the most elastic supply as government improves,
compared to its elasticity of supply in relation to popularity shocks. If donorspolitical
wisdom is high, a limit on campaign spending will damage welfare. If donorspolitical
wisdom is low and volunteerspolitical wisdom is high, then the tighter the limit the
better. A nite nonzero limit on total spending is optimal only if it is the ordinary
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voter who has the greatest political wisdom, and even this can never make a partial
limit on purely local spending, as used in a number of countries, socially optimal.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1
For party L
h
dpL
dL
=
dV 0/ dL
dV 0/ dh
=
@VL
@KL
dKL
dL
+ @VR
@KR
dKR
dL
+ dVL
dJL
dJL
dL
+ dVR
dJR
dJR
dL
@VL
@KL
dKL
dh
+ @VR
@KR
dKR
dh
+ dVL
dJL
dJL
dh
+ dVR
dJR
dJR
dh
(A1)
where dJ
d
= @J
0
@
+ dJ
dK
dK
d
. Since dJL + dJR  0, dJLdL =  
dJR
dL
and dJL
dh
=  dJR
dh
and,
since we are considering a Nash equilibrium, @VL
@KL
=   @VR
@KR
, dVL
dJL
=  dVR
dJR
. Putting all
this into (A1) gives:
h
dpL
dL
=
@VL
@KL

dKL
dL
  dKR
dL

+ 2dVL
dJL
dJL
dL
@VL
@KL
dK0
dh
+ 2dVL
dJL
dJL
dh
(A2)
where K 0 = KL   KR. Then, since in a Nash equilibrium JL = 0:5 and since V =
KJ1 , so that @V
@K
= V
K
and @V
@J
= (1 )V
K
and given equation (5) (A2) simplies to
h
dpL
dL
=
 c+ 4 (1  ) dJL
d

KL
dK0
dh
+ 4 (1  ) dJL
dh
(A3)
Therefore,
h
d2pL
d2L
=
4 (1  ) d2JL
d2L

KL
dK0
dh
+ 4 (1  ) dJL
dh
 :
Given equation (2)

JL =
L+R
2
+ ! (gL   gR) + KL   KR + 
h

,
d2JL
d2L
=
d
dL

0:5 +
dJL
dKL
dKL
dL
+
dJL
dKR
dKR
dL

:
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and dJL
dKL
=   dJL
dKR
. Hence, given also equation (5):
d2JL
d2L
=  c d
dL

KL
dJL
dKL

=  c2K 1L
dKL
dL
:
Since dKL
dL
< 0; d
2JL
d2L
> 0 and hence d
2pL
d2L
> 0:
There is thus no interior equilibrium. dp/ d will not necessarily reach a turning-
point at all between  = 0 and  = 0:5, but if it does, the parties will be at a
pessimum, not an optimum.
Proof of Proposition 2
As we have seen, the only two possible equilibria are L = z = 1   R and
L = R = 0:5. However, consider what would happen at the disequilibrium posi-
tion L = z, R = 0:5. If  = 1, then V 0 = Kj=z   Kj=0:5 > 0. If  = 0, then
V 0 = J j=z  J j=0:5 < 0, while dV 0/ d =  (logKL   log JL   logKR + log JR) > 0.
Therefore, when L = z, R = 0:5, there is a unique  (call it ) at which V 0 = 0
and hence pL = 0:5; and when  > (<), pL > (<) 0:5. Now suppose  >  and
L = R = 0:5. Then L will raise pL by moving to L = z and R will bring pL back
down to 0:5 by moving to R = 1   z. Similarly, if  <  and L = z = 1   R, R
will lower pL by moving to R = 0:5 and L will bring pL back to 0.5 by moving to
L = 0:5 too, which completes the proof.
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Proposition A1: At  = ,
h

dp
dg

P
 

dp
dg

M

=
2 (  ) (1  )VMVP
(XP + YP ) (XM + YM)



dK 0/ dh
K

P
 

dK 0/ dh
K

M

+ 2 (1  )

dJ
dK
dK 0
dh

P
 

dJ
dK
dK 0
dh

M

Proof (omitting the L subscript): Our expression for h dp
dg
is
h
dp
dg
=
dV
0
dK
dK0
dh
+ dV
0
dJ
@J 0
@h
dV 0
dK
dK0
dh
+ dV
0
dJ
@J 0
@h
:
Or, if we call dV
0
dK
dK0
dh
and dV
0
dJ
@J 0
@h
X and Y respectively, h dp
dg
= X+Y
X+Y
)
h

dp
dg

P
 

dp
dg

M

=
(XP + YP ) (XM + YM)  (XM + YM) (XP + YP )
(XP + YP ) (XM + YM)
=
(  ) (XPYM  XMYP )
(XP + YP ) (XM + YM)
where XPYM =
 
dV 0
dK
dK0
dh

P
 
dV 0
dJ
@J 0
@h

M
and XMYP =
 
dV 0
dK
dK0
dh

M
 
dV 0
dJ
@J 0
@h

P
. Given that
dV 0
dK
=
@V 0
@K
+
dV 0
dJ
dJ
dK
=
V
K
+ 2 (1  )V dJ
dK
and dV
0
dJ
= 2 (1  )V then
XPYM =


VP
KP
+ 2 (1  )VP

dJ
dK

P

dK
dh

P
:2 (1  )VM
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and
XMYP =


VM
KM
+ 2 (1  )VM

dJ
dK

M

dK
dh

M
:2 (1  )VP
therefore
h

dp
dg

P
 

dp
dg

M

=
2 (  ) (1  )VMVP
(XP + YP ) (XM + YM)



dK 0/ dh
K

P
 

dK 0/ dh
K

M

+ 2 (1  )

dJ
dK
dK 0
dh

P
 

dJ
dK
dK 0
dh

M

Proposition A2:

dK0/dh
K

M
 

dK0/dh
K

P
> 0.
Proof: dh, an increase in h increases (reduces) the ideological range of Ls (Rs)
political capital by b:dh at both ends (see section 3.1 above) where this is possible.
However, in the polarity case L  z = 0 and there is no more capital on the leftward
fringe to rake in if h rises: the most left-wing person in the country is already working
for party L. But it still gains activists at its rightward fringe L+z (= 2z) and R will
lose activists at both ends. Hence (using equation (3)):
dKL
dhL
 dKR
dhL
= b
 
Kj=2z + Kj=1 2z + Kj=1

= bQ (exp (0:5c) + 2 exp [c (0:5  2z)]) :
Using (4), which gives the result that when L = z,KL =
Q
c
(exp (0:5c)  exp [c (0:5  2z)]),
we have
dKL/ dh
KL
= bc
exp (0:5c) + 2 exp [c (0:5  2z)]
exp (0:5c)  exp [c (0:5  2z)] :
In the median voter case a rise in h will, on our above assumptions, rake in activists
on both Ls fringes and cause an equal loss to R. The sum of Ls gain and Rs loss
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can be written as:
dKL
dhL
  dKR
dhL
= 2b
 
Kj=0:5 + Kj=0:5 z

= 2bQ (1 + exp (cz)) :
Using (4), which gives the result that when L = 0:5, KL =
Q
c
(exp (cz)  1) we have
dKL/ dh
KL
= 2bc
exp (cz) + 1
exp (cz)  1
and therefore
1
bc

dK 0/ dh
K

M
 

dK 0/ dh
K

P

=
2 (exp (cz) + 1)
exp (cz)  1  
exp (0:5c) + 2 exp [c (0:5  2z)]
exp (0:5c)  exp [c (0:5  2z)] :
Writing this as H1
H2
  H3
H4
, it must have the same sign as H1H4 H3H2
exp[c(0:5 z)] = exp (cz) +
3 exp (0:5cz)  4. Given that z and c are both positive, this expression must be posi-
tive too.
Proposition A3: If c is su¢ ciently large,
 
dK0
dh

P
>
 
dK0
dh

M
Proof: Proposition A2 showed that

dK 0
dh

P
 

dK 0
dh

M
= bQ [exp (0:5c) + 2 exp (0:5  2z) c  2  2 exp (zc)]
= bQ exp (0:5c) [1 + 2 exp ( 2zc)  2 exp ( 0:5c)  2 exp (z   0:5) c] :
Given our assumption that z < 0:5, the expression in the square brackets ! 1 as
c!1.
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FOOTNOTES
Acknowledgement. We are grateful to two anonymous referees for their construc-
tive comments which have helped to substantially improve the paper.
1. Exact numbers of volunteers are not readily available, though an article in
Time magazine (Newton-Small, 2008) reported an estimated 8mn for the Obama
campaign. Obamas advantage in volunteers was at least clearly manifest in direct
voter contact. Data from the American National Election Studies Time Series Study
reveal that 17% of the population were contacted directly by the Democrats against
9% for the Republicans (Panagopoulos and Francia, 2009).
2. The legitimacy of this argument is addressed in the literature review below.
3. Notwithstanding the question posed by Ansolabehere et al (2003).
4. There are already a large number of separate explanations for polarization.
This literature is partially reviewed below.
5. Our review of this literature is limited. Ashworth (2008) provides a good
introduction to the issues involved.
6. This idea is also explored by Denzau and Munger (1986) who model special
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interest groups as potential donors.
7. If campaign advertising has no e¤ect on voting, then the question of why par-
ties advertise at all is hard to answer. Parties demonstrably do not have unlimited
resources and could use scarce nances in other ways.
8. May (1973) also cites Hume (1748) and Tocqueville (1835) as supporting the
Leaders as Centristsmodel.
9. Schoeld (2007) proposes that low quality politicians move away from the cen-
tre, in order to distinguish themselves at least on one dimension.
10. Roemer (2001) studies the behavior of intra-party factions and nds that
the presence of factions can help to solve the problem of cycling in political equilib-
ria. Related to the theory proposed in this paper Cox (2006) studies redistributive
politics and argues for a role for mobilization.
11. Of course whether or not this perception is correct is a question for pos-
terity.
12. This occurs when spending on the public good is zero. To make ideas concrete,
suppose that g represents the proportion of the xed public purse spent usefully. That
which is not usefully spent is termed rent.
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13. We acknowledge that activists and donors in reality may also be motivated by
relative distance. For example leftist activists may support (desert) their party when
it positions itself centrally given an extreme (central) position taken by the right. This
response would place a greater premium on centralizing. A defence of the approach
taken here is that activists and donors, behaviorally in practice, are ideological as dis-
tinct from pragmatic. When their own party betraysits roots, activists and donors
become alienated - regardless of the position taken by the opposition. In Hirschmans
(1970) terminology their capacity to exercise voicemay depend on compatible ide-
ology. A supportive anecdote is the experience of the UK between 1997 and 2005.
According to Marshall (2009) the highly centralist Labour administration lost over
half of its membership during this period whilst the consistently rightist (at least until
the election of David Cameron in December 2005) Conservatives lost only 25% of its
membership. Given the secular decline in party membership and that the two parties
maintained a more or less constant ideological stance over this time frame the data
in this instance at least are supportive of the absolutistapproach taken in the paper.
14. In the case of activists this seems obvious. In the case of donors a possi-
ble foundation for this argument comes from Prat (2002), discussed above. Donors
recognize that higher quality (better governance) politicians are more likely to be
elected, and hence are more predisposed to donate.
15. The median voterand polarityoutcomes would merge in the event of L =
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z = 0:5. We rule out such a high value of z as implausible.
16. Heath et al. (1985) also document a marked shift in the 1980s towards polar-
ized two-party competition in the UK.
17. Why is c decisive? Because, as you move from M to P , the extra politi-
cal capital you get from higher g increases so far as you are now in the fat lands of
political radicalism, with plenty of capital at your (and your opponents) margins.
But this is counteracted by the fact that at P you get no additional capital on your
own extreme fringe because theyre all working for you already. However, if c is high
enough, the capital you take away from your opponent at its extreme fringe will (a)
dominate all other considerations and (b) be much larger at P than at M .
18. Looking at equation (9) the mobilization e¤ect will strengthen as we move
to the polarity outcome if
n
dK0/dh
K

P
>

dK0/dh
K

M
o
i.e. never (see proposition A3
in the Appendix), while the conversion e¤ect will strengthen if
 
dJ
dK
dK0
dh

P
>
 
dJ
dK
dK0
dh

M
i.e. if
 
K 1 dK
0
dh

P
>
 
K 1 dK
0
dh

M
.
19. In linking M to g, we are not assuming M depends only on g. This would be
to ignore the money given to political parties in the hope of receiving favors. All we
are saying is that, ceteris paribus, a party which hands rents back to the country may
get more nancial support as a result, and will not get any less i.e. dM/ dg  0.
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20. What counts as local? The answer is that we draw the borderline at whatever
level maximizes the distinction between campaigning where volunteers and money can
and cannot stand in for each other. Space on national or statewide television (M1)
would be di¢ cult to substitute with activists, whilst volunteers could be replaced by
salaried campaign sta¤ (M2).
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Figure 2: Political Capital
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Figure 3: Channels Through Which Ideology Impacts the Vote
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Figure 4: How  Impacts the Quality of Government
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Figure 5: The E¤ects of a Limit on Total Campaign Expenditure
Maloney and Pickering. Page: 58
Figure 6: The E¤ects of Limits on Total (G) and Local (L) Campaign Expenditure
